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ARTICLES
FREE EXERCISE STANDING:
EXTRA-CENTRALITY AS INJURY IN FACT
BRENDAN T. BEERY†
INTRODUCTION
As American society and culture evolve, religious
traditionalists find themselves increasingly anxious and
put-upon.1 It is not easy moving from steward to mere fellow
traveler, resigning one’s dominion over the most intimate affairs
of neighbors less enamored with sectarian dogmas. For the
deposed lawgiver, psychic trauma results not from the tragic end
of his hero story, but from the cruel irrelevance of his will—its
slide from sovereign edict to sad, insistent noise, mere prattle.2 In
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1
See ROBERT P. JONES, THE END OF WHITE CHRISTIAN AMERICA 40 (2017)
(“Today, many white Christian Americans feel profoundly anxious.”).
2
See Betty Glad, Why Tyrants Go Too Far: Malignant Narcissism and Absolute
Power, 23 POL. PSYCHOL. 1, 16 (Mar. 2002) (citation omitted) (summarizing
psychological explanations for tyrannical behavior, and noting, citing numerous
theories, that the tyrannical leader “makes claims for recognition and deference, and
is enraged when it is not forthcoming”). The tyrant’s “control over his political
environment may be used to win support for the grandiose visions of self. He can
command an unusual deference of those in his inner circle and orchestrate worship.”
Id. at 25. “[E]ven loneliness can be countermanded by commands for company at any
time of the night or day.” Id. at 26.
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a society where women largely make their own reproductive
choices3 and same-sex couples may get married,4 religious
traditionalists are quite obviously not making the rules anymore.
So the movement to preserve traditional marriage and limit
access to abortion, grounded though it is in our nation’s Goliathan
religious and cultural traditions,5 nonetheless styles itself these
days as the biblical David—the putative prey set up against bad
odds, armed to take on towering depravity with nothing more than
God’s Word tucked in its sling.6 In the legal realm, and
particularly on a Supreme Court of the United States that now
consists mostly of conservative Christians,7 this morphing in
posture from aggressor to victim has birthed a new paradigm
under which constitutional free exercise is no longer a promise to
oppressed sects or the secular minority that they may practice or
abstain from religious rites and beliefs as they see fit. It is, rather,
a prophylaxis guarding the religious majority against the insult of
abiding outgroups and iconoclasts.8
As I have explained

3
See Brendan T. Beery, Tiered Balancing and the Fate of Roe v. Wade: How the
New Supreme Court Majority Could Turn the Undue-Burden Standard into a
Deferential Pike Test, 28 K AN . J.L. & P UB . P OL ’ Y 395, 395 (2019) (“The proposition
that a woman has an unenumerated constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy, at
least before the point of fetal viability, won the day in 1973. But, as 2018 fades into
2019, no judicial precedent is more endangered than the one that has evolved in a
triumvirate of cases: Roe v. Wade, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, and Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellerstedt . . . .” (citations omitted)).
4
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015).
5
See JONES, supra note 1, at 39–40 (referring to “white Protestantism” as
“arguably the most powerful cultural force in the history of our country”).
6
See id. at 43–44 (“There is much at stake for the country in whether [white
evangelical Christians] retreat into disengaged enclaves, band together to launch
repeated rounds of what the sociologist Nathan Glazer has called ‘defensive
offensives’—in which a formerly powerful majority recasts itself as a beleaguered
minority in an attempt to preserve its particular social values—or find a way to
integrate into the new American cultural landscape.”).
7
See Julie Zauzmer, As Trump Picks Kavanaugh for the Supreme Court,
Evangelicals Rejoice: ‘I Will Vote for Him Again’, WASH. POST (July 9, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2018/07/09/as-trump-picks-asupreme-court-justice-evangelicals-rejoice-i-will-vote-for-him-again (noting that “this
cadre of evangelical voters . . . have received what they wanted — two nominations,
enough to create a five-members conservative majority on the court”).
8
See Greg Sargent, The Walls Around Trump Are Crumbling. Evangelicals May
Be His Last Resort., WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/2019/01/02/walls-around-trump-are-crumbling-evangelicals-may-be-hislast-resort/ (statement of Robert Jones, CEO & founder of the Public Religion
Research Institute) (“[President Trump’s proposed border wall] embodies a white
evangelical view of the world ‘as a dangerous battleground’ made up of ‘chosen insiders
and threatening outsiders’ . . . .”).
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elsewhere, under the emerging Supreme Court majority, free
exercise will not be about freedom to—it will be about
freedom from.9
Whenever free exercise, legally, is to be applied in a
prophylactic sense—when it is to function effectively to protect
believers, and particularly adherents to prevailing majoritarian
belief systems—courts have to find some cognizable harm in
believers’ plight and inability to conform the world around them
to their own codes of behavior. After all, Article III of the United
States Constitution excludes any matter that is not a case or
controversy from federal court jurisdiction.10 One is entitled to
judicial relief, therefore, only if one has standing—if one has
been injured in some concrete way.11 To have standing in a
constitutional case against the government, a litigant must have
suffered an injury in fact fairly traceable to the conduct of the
government where the injury is redressable by a court.12
If I am a believer in scriptures and holy books and the
rightness of my own reading of them, what am I to say about my
new station—an unhappy place where, although I need not
conform my beliefs or religious behaviors to anyone else’s liking, I
must nonetheless suffer an awareness about my orbit of people
and practices anathema to my own personal constitution? What
is the harm attendant to the irrelevance of my will? What is the
harm attendant to merely existing in a society where lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender (“LGBT”) rights must be abided and
honored, or where other people may use contraceptive methods
that I might call “abortifacients”? What is the harm to me? That
I am aghast?
In a sense, as it turns out, that is the harm. As the Supreme
Court takes up its station as custodian of traditional
Judeo-Christian values and gives voice to conservative casualties
of areligious insensitivity, such emotional harm will likely also
constitute the “injury in fact” required to confer on a litigant legal
standing to challenge secular governments’ laws and policies.

9

See Brendan Beery, Prophylactic Free Exercise: The First Amendment and
Religion in a Post-Kennedy World, 82 A LB. L. R EV. 121, 122 (2018).
10
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams.
United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 471–75 (1982).
11
See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984), abrogated by Lexmark Intern.,
Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014).
12
See id.
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In light of this situation, the standing doctrine applied in some
lower courts will have to yield to a new reality. In a recent case,
Nikolao v. Lyon, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals opined that a
plaintiff in a free exercise case has suffered an injury in fact only
if “the state compels her ‘to do or refrain from doing an act
forbidden or required by one’s religion, or to affirm or disavow
a belief forbidden or required by one’s religion.’ ”13
This
conceptualization would be so, however, only if the exercise of
religion were regarded as dynamic—as involving, in other words,
“things like expressing belief, praying, gathering for worship
services, [and] participating in rituals and sacraments and rites.”14
If, on the other hand, the constitutional promise of free exercise
entitles believers to a safe space—a space within which they are
free from entangling themselves with the areligious choices of
their fellow citizens—then this conception of injury will not do.15
Part I of this Article surveys standing doctrine generally and
tackles the problem of psychic insult—what might fairly, in some
cases, be characterized as hurt feelings—as an injury. Part II
addresses the special problems of finding concrete and palpable
injuries in religion cases, noting that it is more difficult to identify
such injuries in Establishment Clause cases than in free exercise
cases. When free exercise is viewed as dynamic and kinetic, free
exercise injuries are discernible and concrete: they occur when a
person is forced to participate in religious undertakings or express
beliefs against his or her will, or when a person is forced to abstain
from participating in religious undertakings or expressing his or
her beliefs. When free exercise is viewed as prophylactic, on the
other hand, the alleged injuries become much more ethereal and
abstruse: a person may be injured, under this view, by a mere
psychic insult.
Part III discusses why religious traditionalists, and
particularly Christian conservatives in the United States, see
extra-centrality as a concrete injury. It is in the nature of
evangelism that non-adherents be evangelized; non-adherents are
thus viewed as accessorial, and their participation in believers’
mission to correct and convert is therefore a component of
believers’ free exercise of religion. This view of the believer as
central and all others as accessorial engenders the perception of
13
875 F.3d 310, 316 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Mozert v. Hawkins Cty. Bd. of Educ.,
827 F.2d 1058, 1066 (6th Cir. 1987)).
14
Beery, supra note 9, at 122.
15
See id. at 128–35.

2019]

FREE EXERCISE STANDING

583

extra-centrality and irrelevance as injury. And of course the loss
of power by conservative Christians may itself be experienced as a
concrete and palpable injury. So too the tendency of Christians to
see themselves as persecuted contributes to the perception of
concrete and palpable injuries, even where secularists see mere
governmental neutrality. Part IV explains why the coercion
standard elucidated in Nikolao cannot likely survive a new
paradigm under which a majority of the Justices on the Supreme
Court take a prophylactic view of free exercise and regard the
extra-centrality of traditional Judeo-Christian norms in American
life as a concrete and palpable injury.
I.

STANDING DOCTRINE GENERALLY AND THE PROBLEM OF
HURT FEELINGS

Standing doctrine is famously manipulated by judges who,
however much they claim merely to generate mechanical outputs
after sorting inputs through neutral and rigid interpretive
models,16 are, after all, mere humans with their own agendas and
policy preferences.17 As Professor Richard Pierce explains, “[a]
lawyer would [say that a] plaintiff has standing to sue a defendant
if the defendant caused the plaintiff to suffer a legally cognizable
and judicially redressable injury . . . .”18 A political scientist, on
the other hand, would say that “standing depends on the degree of
congruence between the political and ideological goals of the
plaintiff and those of the judges who answer the standing
question.”19 Be that as it may, courts generally view hurt
feelings as the quintessence of an abstract or generalized
non-justiciable “injury.”20
16

See Joseph Kimble, What the Michigan Supreme Court Wrought in the Name of
Textualism and Plain Meaning: A Study of Cases Overruled, 2000–2015, 62 WAYNE L.
REV. 347, 354–55 (2017) (noting that while advocates claim that textualism is “fair to
all sides because they know the interpretive ‘rules,’ or canons, from the outset” there
is “strong evidence that many times in the real world of decision-making, [the canons]
are put to ideological ends”).
17
See generally, Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L.
REV. 1741 (1999) (asserting that standing law is largely dependent upon the political
agenda of the deciding judges).
18
Id. at 1742.
19
Id.
20
See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 (1976)
(“Insofar as these organizations seek standing based on their special interest in the
health problems of the poor their complaint must fail. Since they allege no injury to
themselves as organizations, and indeed could not in the context of this suit, they can
establish standing only as representatives of those of their members who have been
injured in fact, and thus could have brought suit in their own right.”); O’Shea v.
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In Allen v. Wright, widely regarded as the leading Supreme
Court authority on standing,21 the parents of African American
children alleged that the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) fostered
a de facto segregated school system after Brown v. Board of
Education22 by failing to enforce its own rules, under which the
IRS should have revoked the tax-exempt status of private schools
that discriminated on the basis of ethnicity.23 The parents alleged
that the existence of a segregated school system sent a message to
African American children that having to function within such a
system caused “stigmatic injury, or denigration.”24 As to this claim
of injury, the Court stated, “If the abstract stigmatic injury were
cognizable, standing would extend nationwide to all members of
the particular racial groups against which the Government was
alleged to be discriminating . . . regardless of . . . location . . . .”25
The Court fretted that, for example, “[a] black person in Hawaii
could challenge the grant of a tax exemption to a racially
discriminatory school in Maine. Recognition of standing in such
circumstances would transform the federal courts into ‘no more
than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of
concerned bystanders.’ ”26
State courts may apply standing rules that are stricter or
looser than the rules governing Article III standing in federal
courts.27 Nonetheless, “[a]n overwhelming majority of states apply

Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) (citation omitted) (“Abstract injury is not enough.
It must be alleged that the plaintiff has ‘sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury’ as the result of the challenged statute or conduct.”);
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) (“It is clear that an organization whose
members are injured may represent those members in a proceeding for judicial review.
But a mere ‘interest in a problem,’ no matter how longstanding the interest and no
matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient
by itself to render the organization ‘adversely affected’ or ‘aggrieved’ within the
meaning of the [Administrative Procedures Act].”) (alteration in original). I tell
students to consider whether the problem is of the sort one might discuss with one’s
spiritual advisor, psychotherapist, or bartender. If it is, then it might not be the proper
subject for adjudication.
21
See John Harrison, Legislative Power, Executive Duty, and Legislative
Lawsuits, 31 J. L. & POL. 103, 135 (2015).
22
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
23
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 746 (1984), abrogated by Lexmark Intern., Inc.
v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014).
24
Id. at 754.
25
Id. at 755–56.
26
Id. at 756 (quoting United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)).
27
See Paul J. Katz, Standing in Good Stead: State Courts, Federal Standing
Doctrine, and the Reverse-Erie Analysis, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1345–46 (2005)
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some type of constitutional standing doctrine,” and many have
adopted standards similar to the standing rules applied in federal
courts.28 Consider, merely as an example, American Family
Association of Michigan v. Michigan State University Board of
Trustees, a case in which I participated as coauthor of an amicus
brief.29 In that case, the American Family Association of Michigan
claimed that its mission was “to promote the welfare of children
through the promotion and preservation of the traditional family
in our society.”30 The Association challenged a university policy
under which medical benefits were provided to the same-sex
partners of some university employees.31 As to the Association’s
claim of injury, the Michigan Court of Appeals stated, “Plaintiff
asserts that defendant’s benefits policy advances an interest
contrary to plaintiff’s mission and that the policy is ‘at odds with
that which plaintiff seeks to promote.’ ”32 In reference to that
claim of injury, the court stated, “Plaintiff essentially complains
that defendant’s benefits policy is an affront to the values that
plaintiff and its members espouse and promote. Accordingly,
plaintiff has not established that it suffered a concrete and
particularized, actual or imminent injury distinct from that of the
citizenry at large . . . .”33
In both federal and state courts, then, jurists tend to eschew
claims of injury reflecting some amorphous sense of psychic upset,
even when those feelings accompany an injustice as palpable as
racial discrimination. One scholar has noted that the Supreme
Court’s reticence to recognize stigmatic harm as a cognizable
injury might, in some circumstances, be short-sighted:
In brief, stigma is a mark of disgrace imposed on individuals who
possess a characteristic or trait that society views as deeply
discrediting. This mark spoils the social identity of its bearer and
reduces him “from a whole and usual person to a tainted,
discounted one.” Stigma invites discrimination and prejudice
against the stigmatized, poses threats to their self-esteem, and
creates self-doubt that can diminish their abilities, thus

(explaining that state courts may apply standing rules that are stricter or looser than
federal standing rules even when applying federal law).
28
Wyatt Sassman, A Survey of Constitutional Standing in State Courts, 8 KY. J.
EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT. RESOURCES L. 349, 353 & n.14 (2015–2016).
29
739 N.W.2d 908, 910 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007).
30
Id.
31
See id.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 915–16.
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confirming the very stereotypes that help generate stigma in the
first place. These injuries are as significant and concrete as other
injuries the Court has recognized. Moreover, these harms
distinguish the stigmatized individual from a concerned
bystander who merely seeks to vindicate value interests.34

It is especially puzzling that Justice O’Connor, who authored
the Court’s Allen opinion, was so dismissive of stigmatic harm as
a cognizable injury in the context of racial discrimination. Justice
O’Connor, after all, “wrote that governmental endorsement of
religion is impermissible because it ‘sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents
that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community.’ ”35 But as will be discussed immediately below,
Justice O’Connor’s more accommodating approach to standing in
religion cases might have to do with how difficult it can be to
identify a concrete injury in some of those cases.
II. STANDING IN RELIGION CASES
As I have summarized elsewhere,
There are two religion clauses in the Constitution. The first is
the Establishment Clause, which is widely understood
as enjoining governmental entanglement with religion,
endorsement of religion, or coercion. According to the Supreme
Court, the principle undergirding the Establishment Clause is
neutrality: the government may not favor religion over nonreligion, non-religion over religion, or one religion over another.
The second is the Free Exercise Clause, which is also understood,
as a matter of the political philosophy prevailing at the time [of]
the Constitution’s drafting, as requiring the government to be
neutral as to religion—as to its existence and its exercise in the
lives of citizens: “[The] history [of the union of church and state]
prompted John Locke to urge toleration and stress the necessity
of distinguishing ‘the business of civil government from that of
religion’ and establishing clear boundaries between them.”36

34

Thomas Healy, Stigmatic Harm and Standing, 92 IOWA L. REV. 417, 422 (2007)
(citations omitted).
35
Id. at 437 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (O’Connor,
J., concurring)).
36
Beery, supra note 9, at 123–24 (alterations in original) (quoting Priests for Life
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 808 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Brown, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)).
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It is not hard to see how governmental interference in the free
exercise of religion might result in a concrete and palpable injury:
being forced to participate in or refrain from some prayer, rite,
sacrament, or expression of belief goes well beyond the merely
hypothetical or speculative, and well beyond the realm of merely
hurt feelings. But what is the injury in the typical Establishment
Clause case—when the government gives aid to religious schools,37
displays a creche on public property,38 or merely permits the
recitation of a prayer before a public-school football game?39 The
issue of standing in Establishment Clause cases has befuddled
courts for decades,40 and as discussed below, the issue of standing
in Free Exercise Clause cases is becoming something of a hash,
too.
A.

Establishment

“[T]he concept of injury for standing purposes is particularly
elusive in Establishment Clause cases.”41 Cases arising under the
Establishment Clause often fall into one or more of three
categories: cases involving governmental aid, money or materials,
provided to religious organizations;42 religious displays on public
property;43 or some kind of prayer, religious instruction, or
promotion of religion in public schools.44 Of the two religion
clauses, it is easier to see the difficulty in articulating an injury in
establishment cases:
Several of the Court’s Establishment Clause cases might . . . be
understood as resting, at least implicitly, on stigmatic harm. In
many Establishment Clause cases, the plaintiff argues that his
tax dollars are being improperly used to support an
establishment of religion. The injury in these cases is the
plaintiff’s loss of money . . . . But in many religious display cases
the challenged conduct . . . costs no money . . . .

37

See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 801 (2000).
See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 670–71 (1984).
39
See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294 (2000).
40
See Saladin v. City of Milledgeville, 812 F.2d 687, 691 (11th Cir. 1987).
41
Id.
42
See, e.g., Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 801.
43
See, e.g., Allegheny Cty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 578–79
(1989); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 670–71.
44
See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 294; Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 580 (1992), Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 580–81 (1987).
38
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If the plaintiffs in these cases are not complaining about the loss
of tax dollars, what exactly is their injury? Some lower courts
have held that a plaintiff is injured if he has altered his conduct
to avoid seeing an offensive religious display. Other courts have
held that a plaintiff is injured if he is forced to confront an
offending display as part of his regular routine, even if he does
not alter his conduct to avoid the display. The Supreme Court
has not embraced either approach, although it has hinted that a
plaintiff who wishes to challenge a religious display must
encounter the display on a regular basis.
In the absence of an explanation from the Court, some scholars
suggest the answer can be found in the endorsement test, first
articulated by Justice O’Connor . . . . “The Establishment
Clause,” Justice O’Connor wrote, “prohibits government from
making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s
standing in the political community.” She then wrote that
governmental endorsement of religion is impermissible because
it “sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not
full members of the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of
the political community.”
O’Connor’s discussion of endorsement was directed to the merits
of the case, not the issue of standing. But it sheds light on her
view of the injury in religious display cases. Plaintiffs in these
cases are harmed, she implies, because the government’s
endorsement of religion casts them as outsiders, as second-class
citizens not deserving of the same consideration given to
adherents. Though not described as stigmatic harm, this injury
sounds very much like the denigration alleged by the African
American parents in Allen. . . .
The Court has never formally linked the endorsement test to the
issue of standing. But a majority of the Court has adopted
O’Connor’s test as one way to determine whether government
action violates the Establishment Clause. Thus, one might
conclude that standing in religious display cases rests, at least in
part, on the stigmatic harm inflicted by governmental
endorsement of religion.45

45
Healy, supra note 34, at 436–38 (first quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
687 (1984) (O'Connor, J. concurring); then quoting id. at 687–88).
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The difficulty in articulating a concrete injury in
Establishment Clause cases may be the genesis of the
taxpayer-standing rule articulated in Flast v. Cohen.46 As a
general matter, a person does not have standing to challenge a
federal governmental law or policy merely because that person is
a taxpayer.47 Taxpayer status indicates the presence of a
generalized rather than particularized grievance.48 In Flast, the
plaintiffs alleged that they had standing as taxpayers to challenge
a federal program under which books and material were provided
to religious schools.49
In a somewhat tortured exercise, the Court carved out an
exception to the general prohibition against federal taxpayer
standing when a plaintiff taxpayer demonstrates that she is
challenging an exercise of congressional taxing and spending—
rather than its regulatory power more broadly—and when a
logical nexus between taxpayer status and the challenged law can
be established by showing a distinct textual limitation on
Congress’s power to tax and spend.50 The Court held that the
plaintiffs in Flast had met this test.51 First, the Court noted that
they challenged a congressional spending program rather than
Congress’s broad authority to regulate.52 Second, as a historical
matter, the Court concluded that the Establishment Clause was
intended to limit Congress’s authority to spend taxpayers’ money
on religion and thereby force taxpayers to participate in religious
establishment.53

46

392 U.S. 83, 102–03 (1968).
See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923).
48
See id.
49
See Flast, 392 U.S. at 85–86.
50
See id. at 103.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
James Madison, who is generally recognized as the leading architect of the
religion clauses of the First Amendment, observed in his famous Memorial
and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments that “the same authority
which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for
the support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other
establishment in all cases whatsoever.”
Id. (quoting 2 JAMES MADISON, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 186 (Gaillard Hunt
ed., 1901)).
47
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Indulging this kind of contortionism bespeaks the difficulty in
identifying a concrete injury when the government promotes
religion.54 Since the promotion of religion is not a zero-sum
enterprise where help to one necessarily comes at the
demonstrable and particularized expense of another,55 one
struggles to see where any person might allege a concrete injury
in such cases. That being so, courts would rarely if ever get at the
issue; and if courts want to get at the issue, they will have to
undertake the legal fictions and machinations characterized by
the Flast decision in search of some cognizable injury. As
Professor Thomas Healy noted in his incisive article, Stigmatic
Harm, finding an injury is even more difficult in cases involving
public displays,56 and the same might be said for prayer in
schools.57 Really, what is one to say when one sues to challenge a
religious display or a religious incantation? It bothered me
terribly?58
54
See Mark C. Rahdert, Forks Taken and Roads Not Taken: Standing To
Challenge Faith-Based Spending, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1009, 1017–18 (2011) (citations
omitted). Professor Rahdert explains:
The difficulties the Court has encountered in standing law have been
particularly vivid in cases involving the Establishment Clause. . . . Each
major period of establishment jurisprudence has been marked by vigorous
judicial debate over the proper limits of standing in cases addressing the
relations of religion, church and state. Sometimes the Court has rejected
standing on controversial Establishment Clause questions. At other
junctures, it has loosened the knots of standing law to enable establishment
challenges that might otherwise evade resolution. At times it has treated the
Establishment Clause as a special case, calling for unique (and more
generous) standing rules. At others it has insisted on treating establishment
matters by the same rules that apply elsewhere, albeit with the same
indeterminacy. In most periods, a coherent approach to standing in
establishment matters has eluded the Court’s grasp.
Id. (citations omitted).
55
An example of a zero-sum enterprise is when an affirmative action program
intended to promote opportunities for ethnic minorities sometimes necessarily
requires the exclusion of a non-minority individual from a certain job or a seat at a
certain school. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307–08 (1978).
56
Healy, supra note 34, at 436–38 (citations omitted).
57
See generally Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
58
See Rahdert, supra note 54, at 1018–19. Professor Rahdert notes:
One of the most persistent sources of controversy concerns the relative roles
of tangible “pocket-book” and intangible “psychic” injury in conferring
Establishment Clause standing. Some Justices, notably including Justice
Jackson . . . and Justice Scalia . . . , have suggested that the absence of
significant discernible and reasonably direct pecuniary or other tangible
harm ought to counsel heavily against Establishment Clause standing. Yet
in other situations, such as its public school prayer decisions, the Court has
treated non-pecuniary psychic harm as a sufficient ground for jurisdiction,
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If the Establishment Clause is more about the government
refraining from its own participation in religion and the Free
Exercise Clause is more about the government abstaining from
interference in the religious beliefs and practices of individuals
under the government’s jurisdiction, it would seem that the latter
would engender injuries far more concrete than the former,
making it easier to find a plaintiff with standing to sue for an
alleged free exercise violation. In Flast, the Court stated that
“standing requirements will vary in First Amendment religion
cases depending upon whether the party raises an Establishment
Clause claim or a claim under the Free Exercise Clause.”59 But
the Court applied its taxpayer-nexus exception only in the context
of the Establishment Clause:
“We have noted that the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment does specifically
limit the taxing and spending power conferred by Art. I, [§] 8.
Whether the Constitution contains other specific limitations can
be determined only in the context of future cases.”60
The Court’s reticence to wade into the shallows of free exercise
with its new taxpayer-standing doctrine likely resulted from its
understanding that such intellectual gymnastics would not be
necessary for a plaintiff who might allege, for example, that the
government had either made her pray a prayer that she did not
want to pray or made her abstain from a prayer that she did want
to pray. There is nothing ethereal or abstruse about the injury in
such a case; the injury is, rather, palpable and easily discernible.
B. Free Exercise
As it turns out, however, courts are flirting with a much looser
standard for standing in Free Exercise Clause cases even as they
tighten up those standards with regard to the Establishment
though the Justices have sometimes debated whether or not such harm
needs to approach coercion. The Justices have also debated the degree to
which the source of psychic harm and the directness of its mode of operation
matter. These judgments influence the Court’s willingness to consider
taxpayer standing, since they affect the degree to which the taxpayer’s
relatively symbolic pecuniary harm can be buttressed by appeals to
intangible psychic injury. In general, the broader the role of psychic harm,
the less the presence or absence of pocketbook injury should matter. Debates
over the status of taxpayers in Establishment Clause litigation consequently
become, in effect, coded debates about the kinds of degrees of intangible harm
the Establishment Clause is meant to redress.
Id. (citations omitted).
59
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
60
Id. at 105.

592

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:579

Clause. As to the Establishment Clause, when the Supreme Court
made the turn from the more liberal Warren era to the more
conservative Rehnquist era,61 it narrowed the scope of the Flast
exception to the general prohibition against taxpayer standing by
explicitly stating that the Flast exception applied to only
appropriations of funds by the legislative branch.62
To that end, in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, the Court held that
taxpayers lacked standing to challenge the transfer of a large and
valuable tract of land to a Christian college by a federal executive
agency.63 The lesson was well learned, and when President George
W. Bush created an “Office of Faith-Based Initiatives,” the office
and its satellite offices in federal agencies were empowered not to
appropriate funds, but to assist religious organizations in their
efforts to qualify for federal money.64 Once again, the Supreme
Court held that no mere taxpayer had standing to challenge the
expressly faith-friendly program.65
In Establishment Clause cases under the conservative
majority on the Court, then, a plaintiff must allege a concrete
and particularized injury.
Furthermore, “the psychological
consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with
which one disagrees” does not constitute “an injury sufficient to
confer standing under Art. III.”66 And if that means that no one
has standing, that would seem to suit the Court. In Valley Forge
Christian College, the Court stated, “[t]he assumption that if
[certain parties] have no standing to sue, no one would have
standing, is not a reason to find standing.”67
Justice Gorsuch, with Justice Thomas joining him, recently
illuminated the likely way forward for the Court in Establishment
Clause cases. In his concurring opinion in American Legion v.
American Humanist Association, Justice Gorsuch wrote:
61
See Frank B. Cross, et al., Warren Court Precedents in the Rehnquist Court, 24
CONST. COMMENT. 3, 8 (2007) (“One might expect the relatively conservative
Rehnquist Court to make limited use of the relatively liberal Warren Court
precedents.”).
62
See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and
State, 454 U.S. 464, 478–79, 481 (1982).
63
Id. at 479–80.
64
See Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 593–95 (2007).
65
See id. at 608–09.
66
Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 485.
67
Id. at 489 (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974)).
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The [American Humanist] Association claims that its members
“regularly” come into “unwelcome direct contact” with a World
War I memorial cross . . . “while driving in the area.” And this,
the Association suggests, is enough to allow it to insist on a
federal judicial decree ordering the memorial’s removal.68

Somewhat derisively, Justice Gorsuch continued, “Maybe, the
Association concedes, others who are less offended lack standing
to sue. Maybe others . . . who come into contact with the memorial
too infrequently lack standing as well. But . . . its members are
offended enough—and with sufficient frequency—that they may
sue.”69 Justice Gorsuch then stated, consistently with the Court’s
apparent view in Valley Forge Christian College, “[t]his ‘offended
observer’ theory of standing has no basis in law.”70
At the same time, in Free Exercise Clause cases,71
conservative federal judges have gone so far as to find a
substantial burden where the government has required no more
than that an employer provide health insurance plans to
employees that include contraceptive coverage,72 or that employers
may opt out of providing such coverage by filing a form.73
This new paradigm, a narrower view of Establishment Clause
standing and a broader view of free exercise standing—at least a
free exercise injury—is consistent with a federal judiciary that is
inclined to see a robust role for religion, and particularly the
religious beliefs and practices associated with conservative
Christianity, in public life.74 Such an attitude would, naturally,
68

Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2098 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) (quoting Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Maryland-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning
Comm’n, 874 F.3d 195, 203 (4th Cir. 2017), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Am.
Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019)).
69
Id. (citations omitted).
70
Id.
71
Some of these cases arise under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(“RFRA”), which, like the First Amendment itself, requires judicial intervention when
a government “substantially burdens the exercise of religion.” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 690 (2014).
72
See id. at 691–92.
73
See generally Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 772
F.3d 229, (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016)
(per curiam)).
74
See Katherine Stewart, Opinion, Whose Religious Liberty Is It Anyway?,
N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/08/opinion/kavanaughsupreme-court-religious-liberty.html. Stewart wrote:
In answer to [Senator Ted] Cruz’s invitation to discuss “religious liberty,”
Judge Kavanaugh spoke movingly about the suffering of those who were
prevented from bringing their religion into “the public square.” But he had
next to nothing to say about the benefits that have flowed . . . from the many
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lead one to limit access to courts for those who see some difficulty
with the government promoting favored religious beliefs while
providing access to those who see secular laws as burdening
favored religious beliefs. This attitude also reflects a shift in the
way judges define free exercise, as will be discussed more
thoroughly below; whereas free exercise was once seen as dynamic
in nature, it is now seen as prophylactic.75 A free exercise injury,
therefore, may now be alleged not only by someone claiming
active interference in her beliefs or practices, but also by someone
claiming that her participation in the secular social compact is
itself injurious when secular laws fail to accommodate her
religious sensibilities.76
1.

When Free Exercise is Dynamic

There was a time, particularly when Justice Scalia was
interpreting the law, when suspicions about free exercise claims
running amok led the Supreme Court to take a narrow view of the
Free Exercise Clause’s reach. For example, when adherents to a
Native American religion claimed a free exercise right to use
peyote as part of their religious rites and rituals,77 the Court, with
Justice Scalia writing for the majority, stated:
But the “exercise of religion” often involves not only belief and
profession but the performance of (or abstention from) physical
acts: assembling with others for a worship service, participating
in sacramental use of bread and wine, proselytizing, abstaining
from certain foods or certain modes of transportation. It would
landmark decisions that have prevented religious groups from using the
power of the state to impose their views. He endorsed the appeal to “history
and tradition” in justifying the mixing of religion and government functions,
but showed no awareness that such appeals invariably confer privilege on
those religions best able to claim this history for themselves. He celebrated
recent rulings that establish the right of religious groups to participate in
“public programs,” but failed to note that the concerns those rulings raise
have to do with the use of taxpayer funds by religious groups whose beliefs
are not universally shared – and whose discriminatory practices are at odds
with laws that apply to the rest of the nonprofit (and for-profit)
world. . . . Judge Kavanaugh’s disdain for the separation of church and state
will matter in decisions that go well beyond the usual battlegrounds in the
culture war.
Id.
75

See Beery, supra note 9, at 128–35.
See Stewart, supra note 74 (“Let’s call it by its true name: religious privilege,
not religious liberty. Today’s Christian nationalists want the ability to override the
law where it conflicts with their religious beliefs, and thus to withdraw from the social
contract that binds the rest of us together as a nation.”).
77
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874, 878 (1990).
76
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be true, we think (though no case of ours has involved the point),
that a State would be “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]”
if it sought to ban such acts or abstentions only when they are
engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious
belief that they display. It would doubtless be unconstitutional,
for example, to ban the casting of “statues that are to be used for
worship purposes,” or to prohibit bowing down before a golden
calf.
[The religious objectors] in the present case, however, seek to
carry the meaning of “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]”
one large step further. They contend that their religious
motivation for using peyote places them beyond the reach of a
criminal law that is not specifically directed at their religious
practice, and that is concededly constitutional as applied to those
who use the drug for other reasons. They assert, in other words,
that “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]” includes requiring
any individual to observe a generally applicable law that requires
(or forbids) the performance of an act that his religious belief
forbids (or requires). As a textual matter, we do not think the
words must be given that meaning. It is no more necessary to
regard the collection of a general tax, for example, as “prohibiting
the free exercise [of religion]” by those citizens who believe
support of organized government to be sinful, than it is to regard
the same tax as “abridging the freedom . . . of the press” of those
publishing companies that must pay the tax as a condition of
staying in business. It is a permissible reading of the text, in the
one case as in the other, to say that if prohibiting the exercise of
religion (or burdening the activity of printing) is not the object of
the tax but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable
and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been
offended.78

Under this view, the Free Exercise Clause is violated only
when the government intentionally targets certain beliefs because
of their religious nature or when the government manifestly
interferes with one’s religious practices or abstentions because of
their religious nature. In the same vein, in Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the Court struck down an

78

Id. at 877–78 (second alteration added).
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ordinance that was plainly directed against religious practices in
that it barred the practice of animal sacrifice, but only when
undertaken in the context of a religious ritual of some kind.79
This view of free exercise makes sense. Were the Court to
indulge a broader view, one that accommodates objections to laws
or policies that do not target activities or beliefs based on their
religiosity, the attendant mischief would be easy to imagine: a
person claiming, while being cited for speeding, that she must
travel at least ninety miles per hour to commune with the
almighty; or a person claiming immunity from arson statutes on
the basis of his fire worship; or, of course, the likely rampant
emergence of a widespread religious objection to paying taxes.
And this narrower view of the Free Exercise Clause’s reach
comports with the common understanding of the word exercise:
There seems some confusion about the word exercise. Exercise
means “the act of bringing into play or realizing in action.” It is
“[a]n activity carried out for a specific purpose.” To exercise
something is to engage in “the use of something.” “If you exercise
something such as your authority, your rights, or a good quality,
you use it or put it into effect.” The exercise of something cannot,
by definition (it would seem), be passive or inert. The exercise of
something is, rather, active and kinetic—it is dynamic.80

Indeed, the further back one goes in search of the meaning of the
word “exercise,” the more dynamic “exercise” seems to be.
According to the 1828 American Dictionary of the English
Language, exercise meant:
In a general sense, any kind of work, labor or exertion of body.
Hence, (1) Use; practice; the exertions and movements customary
in the performance of business; as the exercise of an art, trade,
occupation, or profession [or] (2) Practice; performance; as the
exercise of religion [or] . . . (10) Act of divine worship. . . .81

79
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
535–36, 547 (1993).
80
Beery, supra note 9, at 125 (quoting Exercise, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY
(online ed.), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/exercise (last visited Oct. 9,
2019)); Exercise, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES (online ed.), https://en.oxford
dictionaries.com/definition/exercise (last visited Oct. 9, 2019); Exercise, CAMBRIDGE
ENG. DICTIONARY (online ed.), https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/
exercise (last visited Oct. 9, 2019); Exercise, COLLINS ENG. DICTIONARY (online ed.),
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/exercise (last visited Oct.
9, 2019)).
81
Exercise, WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY 1828 (online ed.), http://webstersdictionary
1828.com/Dictionary/exercise (last visited Oct. 9, 2019).
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So the government, when the term free exercise is properly
understood, need not accommodate believers’ every sensitivity; it
must, rather, keep out of their business when they undertake
religious activities or put their religious rites and rituals to use.
The exercise of religion is not passive; it requires exertion and the
practice or performance of religious acts—acts of worship or
expressions of belief. If this is what free exercise means, then a
free exercise injury would result only from a governmental law or
policy that requires, in some concrete and palpable way, that
individuals either perform and practice religious acts anathema to
their beliefs and consciences or that they abstain from the practice
and performance of acts of worship or expressions of belief.
Certainly, there is no room here for “injuries” grounded in the
mere application of secular laws intended to promote the general
welfare.
2.

When Free Exercise is Prophylactic

Nonetheless, the Court, particularly with Justice Kavanaugh
now among its number, is drifting toward the view that the Free
Exercise Clause, rather than vindicating the individual’s right to
practice and perform her religion and to undertake acts of worship
consistent with her beliefs, additionally functions as a prophylaxis
shielding the believer,82 even in her religious latency, from having
to participate in a society where her beliefs are not accommodated
by the government.83
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Supreme Court
ruled that the federal government, under the Affordable Care Act
(“ACA”),84 could not require that employers provide employees
with health-insurance coverage that, in turn, provided
contraceptive coverage.85 Writing for the Court, Justice Alito
avoided the question of standing, but noted, “If the owners comply
with the HHS mandate, they believe they will be facilitating
abortions . . . .”86 Justice Alito did not state that the owners
actually would be facilitating abortions. Rather, it was enough of
82

Indeed, Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Thomas recently signaled a
willingness to revisit Employment Division v. Smith. See Erwin Chemerinsky,
Chemerinsky: Supreme Court’s Recent Actions are Telltale Signs of Its
Future Direction, ABA J. (Feb. 7, 2019), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
chemerinsky-courts-recent-actions-offer-taste-of-the-future/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2019).
83
See generally Beery, supra note 9.
84
42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2018).
85
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 688–91 (2014).
86
Id. at 691 (emphasis added).
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an injury to implicate free exercise rights—in this case, under
RFRA87—merely to allege that the owners believed that they may
be complicit in the sins of third parties.
In Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, the
Supreme Court invalidated a provision in the Missouri
Constitution that barred the state from providing public
aid to religious organizations.88
Pursuant to Missouri’s
anti-establishment constitutional provision, Trinity Lutheran
Church was denied permission to participate in a state-run
scrap-tire program under which aid recipients could repave
surfaces on their property with tar made from recycled tires.89
Missouri argued that its constitutional ban on government
entanglement with religious organizations did “not prohibit the
Church from engaging in any religious conduct or otherwise
exercising its religious rights” and therefore did “not meaningfully
burden the Church’s free exercise rights.”90 But the Court, per
Chief Justice Roberts, held that Missouri’s anti-establishment
provision “punished the free exercise of religion” by putting
would-be aid recipients to the choice whether to give up the aid or
give up their religious natures.91 The Court went so far as to opine
that Missouri’s provision would require Trinity Lutheran Church
to “renounce its religious character.”92 Under this view of free
exercise, religious adherents are “shielded even from the insult of
state neutrality.”93
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission, a bakery shop owner refused to design a cake for a
same-sex couple’s wedding in defiance of a Colorado civil rights
law that required him to do so.94 “The Court, per Justice
Kennedy . . . wagged its finger at the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission and gave it a stern talking-to about impartiality and
respect, holding merely that . . . the state had been partial in its
dealings with the cake maker.”95 But how did the cake maker have

87

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2018).
137 S. Ct. 2012, 2017, 2024–25 (2017).
89
Id. at 2017.
90
Id. at 2022.
91
Id. at 2021-22 (citing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978)).
92
Id. at 2024 (emphasis added).
93
Beery, supra note 9, at 131 (citing Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2027
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting)).
94
138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723, 1725 (2018).
95
See Beery, supra note 9, at 121 (citing Masterpiece Cakeshop, 137 S. Ct. at
1729–31).
88
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standing to challenge a neutral anti-discrimination law on free
exercise grounds to begin with? The law did not require the cake
maker to undertake a religious exercise or to refrain from one any
more than any civil rights law that governs the conduct of business
people who do business with the public. It was only because the
cake maker’s religious sensibilities were in play that he could have
had standing despite the lack of any discernible interference in
religious activities or targeting of religious beliefs.
Oddly enough, LGBT Americans do not always enjoy similar
consideration when their secular sensibilities are offended. In
Barber v. Bryant, LGBT citizens challenged a Mississippi law that
permitted discrimination against LGBT people on religious
grounds.96 Under the law, the state was not permitted to take
adverse action with regard to tax treatment, benefits, or
employment when an individual acted in accordance with certain
religious convictions in opposition to same-sex relationships and
marriage.97 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
plaintiffs, who were “religious leaders who do not agree with the
[beliefs protected by the Mississippi law], . . . gay and transgender
persons who may be negatively affected by [the law], and . . . other
persons . . . who do not share the . . . beliefs [protected under the
law],”98 had failed to show any more than stigmatic harm, and
therefore lacked standing.99
So it seems that one’s angst is a concrete and palpable injury
as long as it is religious angst and not secular angst. This is why
I have suggested elsewhere that advocates for secular causes
should reframe their arguments in religious terms—that even
atheism and agnosticism should be characterized as “beliefs
about religion.”100 The Court in recent cases seems singularly
unconcerned with beliefs around establishment and free exercise
that are not religious in nature.101
Burwell, Trinity Lutheran Church, and Masterpiece Cakeshop
were decided when Justice Kennedy was still on the
Supreme Court. Justice Kennedy, although he often voted with
conservatives on the Court on religious matters, did voice some

96

860 F.3d 345, 350–51 (5th Cir. 2017).
See id. at 350–52.
98
Id. at 351.
99
Id. at 353.
100
See Beery, supra note 9, at 152–54 (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 736–37 (2014) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
101
Id.
97
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concern about the implications of the Court’s implicit conclusion
that state neutrality was itself such an insult that it constitutes a
free exercise injury:
Justice Kennedy, although he concurred [in Trinity Lutheran
Church], was discernably disquieted over the potential reach of
the decision, claiming (hoping?) that the opinion “does not have
the breadth and sweep ascribed to it by the respectful and
powerful dissent,” and stating, as an aside, that free exercise
means “the right to express . . . beliefs and to establish one’s
religious (or nonreligious) self-definition in the political, civic,
and economic life of our larger community. But in a complex
society and an era of pervasive governmental regulation, defining
the proper realm for free exercise can be difficult.”102

But Justice Kennedy has been replaced by Justice
Kavanaugh, who seems to be a proponent of the prophylactic view
of free exercise. In Priests for Life v. U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit considered whether the ACA violated
employers’ free exercise rights by requiring any employer wishing
to opt out of the mandatory-contraceptive-care provision of the law
to do so by filing a form.103 Then-Judge Kavanaugh dissented from
an order denying to rehear the case en banc and noted that many
religious adherents who were subject to the opt-out provision of
the ACA “bitterly objected to this scheme” because it would
“make[] them complicit in providing coverage for contraceptives,
including some that they believe operate as abortifacients” and
make the employers “complicit in the scheme” created by the
ACA.104
Then-Judge Kavanaugh wrote that “under Hobby Lobby, the
regulations substantially burden the religious organizations’
exercise of religion because the regulations require the
organizations to take an action contrary to their sincere religious
beliefs (submitting the form) or else pay significant monetary
penalties.”105 This rationale is the prophylactic approach to free
exercise:

102

Id. at 133 (quoting Burwell, 573 U.S. at 736–37 (2014) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
103
See generally 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S.
Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam)).
104
Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 808 F.3d 1, 15 (D.C.
Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
105
Id.
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[I]t is a substantial burden on the exercise of religion to cause a
religious believer the pique of having to submit to a bureaucratic
certification that would allow the believer to opt out of having to
comply with a neutral and even-handed law that would,
allegedly, entangle the believer in the areligious private choice of
an employee to access contraceptives under an insurance policy
written and administered by a third-party insurance carrier.106

The Supreme Court’s new majority seems squarely of a mind
to hold that in free exercise cases, unlike in establishment cases,
a plaintiff—particularly if the plaintiff is Christian107—may plead
a cognizable injury just by averring psychic insult, assuming that
the psychic insult is grounded in religious dogmas.108
The question arises why the Court, which more and more
reflects conservative Christian orthodoxy in its membership,109
sees state neutrality as to religion or mere compliance with neutral
secular edicts in and of themselves ethereal and unremarkable
components of participation in the social compact, as such grave
injuries.

106

Beery, supra note 9, at 134 (citation omitted).
Islam, for example, has engendered little sympathy from the Supreme Court
in its recent decisions. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2408–09, 2418–19 (2018)
(declining to place dispositive weight on anti-Muslim statements made by the
President in public, and instead deferring to the judgment of President Donald J.
Trump in barring entry into the United States of individuals from several
predominantly Muslim nations); see also Dunn v. Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661, 661–62 (2019)
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (vacating a stay of execution in the case of a Muslim prisoner
who, unlike Christian prisoners in the Alabama prison system, was denied the
presence of a spiritual advisor of his choice during his execution); see also Stewart,
supra note 74 (“If your religion or deeply held moral beliefs include the view that all
people should be treated with equal dignity, then this religious liberty won’t do
anything for you. If you’re a taxpayer who helps to fund your local hospital, a patient
who keeps it in business, or a professional who works there, then your sincerely held
religious and moral conviction that all people are entitled to equal access to the
best medicine that science can provide and the law permits won’t stand a chance
against a Catholic bishop’s conviction that some procedures are forbidden by a
higher authority.”).
108
The new Supreme Court Justice also seems enamored with corporate
religiosity: “Judge Kavanaugh’s record shows he also has a special place in his heart
for the mystical belief systems of corporations. He endorsed the Hobby Lobby decision,
which allowed that corporation to use its religious beliefs to deny birth control
coverage to its employees.” Stewart, supra note 74.
109
See Katie Kelaidis, How a Catholic Majority SCOTUS Fulfilled an Evangelical
Dream, REWIRE.NEWS (July 23, 2018, 2:13 PM), https://rewire.news/religiondispatches/2018/07/23/how-a-catholic-majority-scotus-fulfilled-an-evangelical-dream
(“[I]t seems hard to accept as coincidence that the current Court’s demographics began
to take shape in the 1980s, a decade that marked the arrival of the religious right to
the highest levels of political power.”).
107
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III. INSULT AS INJURY
Conservative Christians have long wanted to make their
mark on the federal judiciary,110 and certainly they have
succeeded.111 So to understand the Supreme Court majority’s
views about religion and psychic insult as a concrete injury, one
must understand the worldview and perspectives of religious
conservatives more broadly.
In the free exercise cases discussed above, federal judges
found cognizable harm even in injuries that seemed to fall far
short of the stigmatic harm alleged in Allen v. Wright.112 Being
denied tire tar or having to file a form is a far cry from existing in
a racially segregated school system or being tagged with a badge
of inferiority—being made to feel an outsider, a “discrete and
insular” minority set out of the body politic as the weak are culled
from a herd.113 Stigmatic harm of the sort alleged in Allen at least
combines psychic insult with the more palpable harm of class
discrimination and maltreatment. The injuries alleged in Burwell,
Trinity Lutheran Church, Masterpiece Cake Shop, and Priests for
Life did not even have that going for them; they involved psychic
harm alone, decoupled from any claim of societal ostracization or
degradation.

110

See David A. Bosworth, American Crusade: The Religious Roots of the War on
Terror, 7 BARRY L. REV. 65, 76–77 (Fall 2006) (citations omitted) (“While the
Republican Party controlled two branches of the federal government, Christian
nationalists turned their attention to the judiciary . . . pressur[ing] politicians to
appoint their ideological allies to the judiciary . . . .”).
111
See Ann Southworth, Lawyers and the Conservative Counterrevolution, 43
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1698, 1698 (2018) (“The US conservative legal movement is
flourishing. Conservatives and libertarians exercise considerable influence on law and
policy through an infrastructure of organizations, lawyers, and financial patrons.
They have developed a deep bench of highly credentialed lawyers who hold prominent
positions in law firms, advocacy organizations, think tanks, universities, and
government. Republican administrations have drawn on that pool to make judicial
appointments, which has significantly improved conservatives’ prospects for success
in the courts.”); see also Alexander Burns & Jonathan Martin, Michael Cohen’s
Testimony Opens New Phase of Political Turbulence for Trump, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/01/us/politics/michael-cohen-trumpreelection.html (“Ralph Reed, a longtime evangelical leader, said Mr. Trump’s record
of delivering on conservative priorities had effectively cemented his own party in
place, fostering particular loyalty among Christian conservatives with two Supreme
Court appointments and efforts to restrict abortion rights. ‘He made a set of promises
and he not only kept them — he is in many cases exceeding them,’ Mr. Reed said.”).
112
468 U.S. 737, 755–56 (1984).
113
See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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The Nature of Evangelism and the Non-Believer as
Accessorial

But alas, there are reasons why religious conservatives see
secular neutrality and their own loss of control as more serious
injuries than even the stigmatic harm attendant to racial
discrimination. First, it is in the nature of evangelism to pit the
believer as the central figure in a biblically sanctioned design, and
to cast non-believers as instrumentalities necessary to the
evangelical project to proselytize and convert.114 In this sense,
non-believers are accessorial in nature. This paradigm engenders
the perception of loss of centrality as an acute injury.115 Second,
there is the harm inhering in the loss of power when a group that
once enjoyed dominant cultural influence is met, rather than with
obedience, instead with cruel indifference.116 Finally, it is in the
nature of fundamentalist Christians to see their own persecution
as a necessary component of the life of a believer, and Christian
conservatives are therefore predisposed to see resistance or
rejection of their dogmas as persecution—as a concrete and
palpable injury.117 These factors combine to incite claims of injury
that are forlorn and even overwrought.
1.

Evangelism Requires the Participation of Non-Adherents

The notion of secular neutrality—what might be defined as
the non-participation of non-adherents in the religious projects of
Christian conservatives—as a free exercise injury likely has to do
with the nature of evangelism and the missionary calling of many
Christians.
From the birth of the religion, Christians have been spreading
their faith. . . . The “Great Commission” of Jesus lays the
groundwork for Christian missions: “Go therefore and make
disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father
and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit and teaching them to obey
everything that I have commanded you.”118

114

See infra Section III.A.1 and accompanying notes.
See infra Section III.A.2 and accompanying notes.
116
See infra Section III.B and accompanying notes.
117
See infra Section III.C and accompanying notes.
118
Joel A. Nichols, Mission, Evangelism, and Proselytism in Christianity:
Mainline Conceptions as Reflected in Church Documents, 12 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 563,
563 (1998) (quoting Matthew 28:19–20 (NRSV)).
115
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The religious impulse to abide by this command has had some
unfortunate historical outcomes, as the conversion of unbelievers
has not always been achieved through peaceable persuasion.119
In modern American culture, evangelical outreach rarely
approximates the violent misadventures of much of Christian lore,
but there remains an element of aggression.120 “Since Christianity
is, by its nature, a missionary faith, Christians claim the right to
attempt to persuade others of the truth of their faith. Of course,
the right to attempt to convince people to change their religious
beliefs stands in tension with the other party’s right to privacy.”121
John Fea, a historian at Messiah College,122 described modern
evangelism this way: “Evangelicals are primarily concerned with
preaching the gospel, with evangelism, with social justice
ministries . . . . So . . . they’re out trying to win people to Christ.”123
In this sense, modern conservative American Christianity differs
from some other sects and religious movements throughout
history. Jewish people, for example, have generally “had no wish
to convert the Gentiles; they were content with the feeling . . . they
derived from being the Chosen People.”124 As another example,
“Shinto, which teaches that Japan was created earlier than the
rest of the world, is not intended or likely to appeal to those who
are not Japanese.”125

119

See id. at 565 (citations omitted) (“Unhappily, theological justification has been
offered for the use of force since the time of St. Augustine. Using Jesus’ parable of a
great feast, Augustine interpreted the words “compelle intrare” (compel them to come
in) as applicable to those who believed something other than orthodox doctrine: the
heretics. Augustine’s interpretation gave theological justification to all manner of
pressure and persecution of the heterodox over the centuries.”).
120
See Isabelle R. Gunning, Lawyers of All Faiths: Constructing Professional
Identity and Finding Common Ground, 39 J. LEGAL PROF. 231, 271 (2015) (“[L]awyers
who identified with proselytizing forms of Christianity stated that [in their
professional lives] they practiced ‘lifestyle evangelism’ rather than an ‘aggressive
evangelism’ that could conflict with client autonomy.”); Susan J. Stabile, What is
Religious “Persecution” in a Pluralist Society?, 59 VILL. L. REV. 753, 762 (2014)
(“Different Christian traditions have different ideas about what evangelization
means. And some Christians are fairly aggressive in their efforts to try to bring other
people to the Christian faith.”).
121
Nichols, supra note 118, at 565 (citation omitted).
122
MESSIAH COLLEGE, https://www.messiah.edu/a/academics/facultydir/faculty_
profile.php?directoryID=9&entryID=453 (last visited Oct. 11, 2019).
123
Sarah McCammon & Domenico Montanaro, Religion, the Supreme Court and
Why It Matters, NPR (July 7, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/07/07/626711777/
religion-the-supreme-court-and-why-it-matters (quoting John Fea).
124
BERTRAND RUSSELL, POWER: A NEW SOCIAL ANALYSIS 141 (2004).
125
Id. at 141–42.
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On the other hand, in the evangelical view, although it is
advisable for an adherent to engage in humanitarian outreach and
also to live life in a way that exemplifies biblical moral teachings,
it is even more important that the adherents evangelize by
proclaiming their beliefs.126
This summary elucidates a remarkable view of rights as they
relate to evangelical Christian free exercise. Since the very nature
of evangelical Christianity is that exercising one’s religion involves
the participation of non-believers as would-be proselytes, a
non-believer may obstruct an evangelical Christian individual’s
religious calling simply by refusing to participate or at least to be
available. In a paradigm where the believer cannot be the
principal without accessories, accessories must exist and accede;
failure to provide accessorial participation in believers’ project to
proselytize and convert is, in a sense, a denial of free exercise.
Evangelical Protestants127 are not alone in this way of
thinking; Catholicism involves similar values:
The foundation for modern Roman Catholic missiology was laid
by the Second Vatican Council [which reaffirmed] . . . that “the
Church on earth is by its very nature missionary.” . . .

126
Joel A. Nichols, Evangelicals and Human Rights: The Continuing Ambivalence
of Evangelical Christians’ Support for Human Rights, 24 J. L. & RELIGION 629,
635–36 (2008–2009) (citation omitted) ( “[S]ocial action (through assisting those in
need) and ‘“witness’” (living a godly life or by practicing the Eucharist regularly) are
not evangelism. These latter actions are desirable, but rank lower in priority for
evangelicals.”).
127
David M. Smolin, Religion, Education, and the Theoretically Liberal State:
Contrasting Evangelical and Secularist Perspectives, 44 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 99,
99–100 (2005). Professor Smolin states:
For purposes of this essay, I would define evangelical Protestantism as
involving the following:
(1) Adherence to classic Christian orthodoxy, and hence to monotheistic
Trinitarian theology, as reflected in ancient creedal statements such as the
Apostle’s and Nicene Creed.
(2) Acceptance of the Protestant Old Testament and New Testament canon
as inspired scripture and the preeminent source of religious authority, with
such scripture regarded as reliable and true (i.e. infallible/inerrant).
(3) An emphasis on a personal relationship between each individual believer
and God, expressed as a relationship of trust and faith in Christ, which
involves the individual turning away from sin and toward God (personal
repentance).
(4) An emphasis on “evangelism,” based on a Biblical mandate to spread the
Christian faith to persons of every national, ethnic, and cultural group. Thus,
evangelicals believe that the Christian faith represents universal truth and
the way of salvation applicable in every culture.
Id.
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Christ proclaimed his own mission by claiming, “The Spirit of the
Lord is upon me, because he anointed me; to bring good news to
the poor he sent me, to heal the broken-hearted, to proclaim to
the captive release, and sight to the blind.” On another occasion
Christ claimed, “The Son of man has come to seek and to save
what was lost.” The Church, as the Body of Christ, has assumed
Christ’s missionizing nature and task. . . . [M]ost importantly,
the missionary nature of the Church stems from the activity of
the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is the true agent of mission, and
that agent is active in and through the Church. Claiming the
Holy Spirit allows the Church to designate its activities as
God-ordained.
The Church is obligated to “proclaim the faith and salvation
which comes from Christ” because Christ commanded his
apostles (and thus the Church) to go into all nations and make
disciples. The Church carries out its mission to all the nations as
it obediently “makes itself fully present to all men and peoples in
order to lead them to the faith, freedom and peace of Christ by
the example of its life and teaching, by the sacraments and other
means of grace.” The purpose of missionary activity is to “make
Christ present” to those people being evangelized, so that they
may know the mystery and love of Christ.128

“[G]o into all nations and make disciples.”129 Again, the very
nature of one’s religion may be that it requires others as
accessorial participants in the project. If a believer comes to me
and wishes to heal me, to proclaim to me his beliefs, and to make
of me a proselyte, and if I do not allow him at least to try, then in
a very real sense, I am denying him the ability—the “right”—to
practice and perform his religious mission: to exercise his religion.
The centrality principle manifested in this arrangement—the
believer as central and all others as accessorial—is a common
theme among organized religions on a more macro scale, as well.
Geocentrism, until Copernicus came along, reflected humans’
collective narcissism in the assumption that all the universe must
revolve around us:

128

Nichols, supra note 118, at 570–71 (first quoting Luke 4:8; then quoting Luke
9:10; and then quoting Decree of the Church’s Missionary Activity reprinted in
MISSIONS AND RELIGIONS 82–120 ¶¶ 5, 9, 20 (Austin Flannery, OP, ed., Redmond
Fitzmaurice, OP, trans., 1968)).
129
Id. at 571 (quoting Decree of the Church’s Missionary Activity reprinted in
MISSIONS AND RELIGIONS 82–120 ¶ 5 (Austin Flannery, OP, ed., Redmond
Fitzmaurice, OP, trans., 1968)).
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The first [developmental] revolution [preceding the information
age] is the assertion of heliocentrism by Nikolas Copernicus
(1473–1543), which decentered human self-understanding being
the apex at the center of God’s creation by arguing that the sun,
rather than the earth, was at the center of the universe. [The]
second and third revolutions occurred in the late nineteenth
century[. T]he second was Charles Darwin’s Origins of Species,
and the third was . . . the development of Sigmund Freud’s
psychoanalysis. Darwin decentered human beings from the apex
position among animals by showing that animals, including
humans, evolve through historical processes and have common
origins. He showed that human uniqueness does not lay in the
creative source of the species since all species evolve through a
common set of physical processes and the species were less
differentiated in earlier generations. Human beings can no
longer claim to possess a metaphysical essence superior to other
creatures.
While traits, like being rational, might still
distinguish humans from non-humans, rationality itself is not
part of the metaphysical substance of the person as viewed in premodern thought. Freud discovered the unconscious mind and its
influence on reason.
This discovery altered philosophical
anthropology again, this time decentering human beings from
the privileged position of being the only self-aware beings. After
the discovery of the unconscious mind, it was no longer possible
to maintain the belief that human beings know themselves and
consciously control their own actions.130

The Church’s view of geocentrism was sufficiently dogmatic
and foundational that it called one of history’s most esteemed
thinkers, Galileo, before the Inquisition, requiring him to
renounce his own claims of heliocentrism and spend the rest of his
days under house arrest.131 The rebellion of dogmatists—mostly
religious—to the ideas of evolution and the “decentering” of
humankind from the core of all existence is well documented:132
130

Kevin P. Lee, A Preface to the Philosophy of Legal Information, 20 SMU SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 277, 282–83 (2017) (citing LUCIANO FLORIDI, INFORMATION: A VERY
SHORT INTRODUCTION ix, 8–9; Boethius, A Treatise Against Eutyches and Nestorias,
in THE THEOLOGICAL TRACTATES 73–127 (E. Capps et al eds., 2005); DANIEL
DENNETT, DARWIN’S DANGEROUS IDEA: EVOLUTION AND THE MEANINGS OF
LIFE (1995)).
131
See Nathaniel T. Noda, Perpetuating Cultures: What Fan-Based Activities Can
Teach Us About Intangible Cultural Property, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 429, 450 (2011).
132
See Susan Haack, Cracks in the Wall, a Bulge Under the Carpet: The Singular
Story of Religion, Evolution, and the U.S. Constitution, 57 WAYNE L. REV. 1303, 1312
(2011) (citations omitted) (“When the Origin was published, there was a storm of
religious protest: the Bishop of Oxford, ‘Soapy Sam’ Wilberforce, accused Darwin of ‘a
tendency to limit the glory of God in creation,’ declaring that his theory ‘contradict[ed]
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“[Religion] assures [people] that god cares for them individually,
and it claims that the cosmos was created with them specifically
in mind.”133
A claim of entitlement to centrality in our society and culture
is a claim of privilege, not merely a claim to the right to exist
peacefully and be let alone.134 So in the conservative Christian
worldview, the mere governmental tolerance of religion will not do;
author and journalist Katherine Stewart recently argued that
[i]f the Senate confirms Brett Kavanaugh, it will be declaring
that the United States is a nation in which one brand of religion
enjoys a place of privilege; [and] that we are a nation of laws—
except [when] the law offends those who subscribe to our
preferred religion . . . .135

2.

Principal and Accessory

In an article published in 2002, Professor Richard Hiers, in
comments seemingly critical of individualism, wrote:
[Professor] Susan Wolfson’s comments on the problematics of
rights theory based on individualism could be applied to all
jurisprudential systems founded on individual self-interest:
“[B]y having the exclusive focus of the model on the
individual and his autonomous initiative in exercising his
rights, a blindly inaccurate and immoral egocentricity of the
individual is actually a central component of the model
itself . . . . Each individual’s autonomy becomes a virtual law
unto itself unaccountable to anyone else, except in so far as
[ . . . ] in or out of court with the other individual’s conduct.”
the revealed relations of creation to its Creator’; philosopher of science William
Whewell refused to allow the book in the library at Trinity College, Cambridge. When
The Descent of Man was published, Pope Pius IX denounced it as ‘a
system . . . repugnant at once to history, to the tradition of all peoples, to exact science,
to observed facts, and even to Reason itself.’ ” (first quoting 1 ANDREW DICKSON
WHITE, A HISTORY OF THE WARFARE OF SCIENCE WITH THEOLOGY IN CHRISTENDOM
70 (Dover ed., 1960) (1896); then quoting DOUGLAS J. FUTUYMA, SCIENCE ON TRIAL:
THE CASE FOR EVOLUTION 24 (Pantheon Books, 1st ed. 1983))).
133
CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, GOD IS NOT GREAT: HOW RELIGION POISONS
EVERYTHING 74 (2007).
134
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable
to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature,
of his feelings, and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure
and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone—the most
comprehensive of rights, and the right most valued by civilized men.”).
135
Stewart, supra note 74.
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The self may, of course, be regarded as the center of value, and a
person may be committed to the advancement of his or her own
interests. In that case, however, one is concerned for others only
incidentally or instrumentally, to the extent that what is good for
the other is also good for oneself.136

In this passage, Professor Hiers seems to suggest that
individual autonomy is unsatisfactory in its unconcern for the
wellbeing of others. But this arguably misconceives the idea
of individual autonomy. An autonomous individual is not
necessarily unconcerned with the wellbeing of others; he is simply
unwilling to play an accessorial role in somebody else’s story.
Autonomy may be responsive to the claim of others of entitlement
to centrality; it is not necessarily a manifestation of narcissistic or
hedonistic impulses in and of itself. Is it a free spirit on the
periphery of society who is most likely to see others as
instrumentalities or props? Or is it, rather, the person or group
that claims centrality and insists that all others remain in orbit
around the dogmas and missions of the self or the ingroup?
To some, freedom and liberty mean freedom to proselytize and
participate in others’ behavior; autonomy and choice are regarded
as contrary to notions of justice. For example, Michael Gerson, an
evangelical Christian and one-time adviser in the George W. Bush
administration, had this to say about the Democratic Party and its
liberal preferences:
I would love to see the Democratic Party return to a tradition of
social justice that was found in people like William Jennings
Bryan. During that period, many if not most politically engaged
evangelicals were in the Democratic Party, because it was a party
oriented toward justice. I don’t see much of that now in the
Democratic Party. Instead of an emphasis on the weak and
suffering, there’s so much emphasis on autonomy and choice.137

Here, Gershen advances the proposition not just that a preference
for autonomy and choice is a bad thing, but also that autonomy
and choice run counter to social justice and the interests of the

136

Richard H. Hiers, Biblical Social Welfare Legislation: Protected Classes and
Provisions for Persons in Need, 17 J. L. & RELIGION 49, 93 (2002) (quoting Susan A.
Wolfson, Modern Liberal Rights Theory and Jewish Law, 9 J. L. & RELIG. 399,
410–11 (1992)).
137
Robert J. Delahunty, Changing Hearts, Changing Minds: A New Evangelical
Politics?, 47 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 271, 273–74 (2008) (citing Collin Hansen, How
Then Shall We Politick? Michael Gerson, Recently Resigned Bush Speechwriter and
Adviser, on How Evangleicals Should Comport Themselves in the Public Square,
CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Aug. 2006, at 40 (interviewing Michael Gerson)).
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weak and suffering. At the very least, the suggestion is that
autonomy and choice rank lower than social justice, and that they
cannot, therefore, be components of social justice.
From an evangelical standpoint, this makes sense: If the
central mission of one’s life—one’s calling—is to corral, channel,
and correct human behavior, then liberty is not found in one’s
autonomy to make one’s own choices, but rather in freedom to
proselytize—and to prevent the sinking of fellow travelers into the
currents of hedonism—or at least to try. The non-adherent’s role
is to acquiesce to evangelism. And if the believer’s most sacrosanct
calling is in proclamation and intercession—be it passive or
aggressive—then surely the government’s obstruction of that
calling is a burden on free exercise, and a concrete and palpable
injury. Put simply, proclamation requires a receptive audience—
receptive at least to hearing, if not to accepting. If my central
religious mission is to proclaim my beliefs to others, then others
must make themselves available, and their failure to make
themselves available, or the government’s getting between me and
them, leaves me whistling into the wind, unable to perform my
religion and undertake my most essential religious practices.
B. Loss of Power and Control
An obviously related problem for a person or group that has
suffered extra-centric injury is the loss of power and control. To
understand how the loss of power by a religious group or person
can be a concrete and palpable injury, one must rid oneself of the
popular conception of piety as subservience rather than
dominance. As Bertrand Russell opined:
The power impulse has two forms: explicit, in leaders; and
implicit, in their followers. When men willingly follow a leader,
they do so with a view to the acquisition of power by the group
which he commands, and they feel that his triumphs are theirs.
Most men do not feel in themselves the competence required for
leading their group to victory, and therefore seek out a captain
who appears to possess the courage and sagacity necessary for
the achievement of supremacy. Even in religion this impulse
appears.
Nietzsche accused Christianity of inculcating a
slave-morality, but ultimate triumph was always the goal.
‘Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth.’ Or as a
well-known hymn more explicitly states it:
The Son of God goes forth to war,
A kingly crown to gain.
His blood-red banner streams afar.
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Who follows in His train?
Who best can drink his cup of woe,
Triumphant over pain,
Who patient bears his cross below,
He follows in His train.138

If the impulse to acquire power is so innate to the human
endeavor, then losing power after it has been acquired must seem
an acute injury. Indeed, in The Federalist No. 71, Alexander
Hamilton wrote:
It is a general principle of human nature that a man will be
interested in whatever he possesses, in proportion to the firmness
or precariousness of the tenure by which he holds it; will be less
attached to what he holds by a momentary or uncertain title,
than to what he enjoys by a durable or certain title; and, of
course, will be willing to risk more for the sake of the one than
for the sake of the other.139

About this observation, Professor John Wood explains:
This “general principle” combines an understanding of the
endowment effect, loss aversion, and prospect theory,
respectively. People value what they already possess more than
what they do not (endowment effect). People prefer avoiding loss
to acquiring gains (loss aversion). People evaluate outcomes
based on the change that outcome represents from an initial
reference point rather than based on the nature of the outcome
itself (prospect theory). So much was said [by Hamilton] without
reference to a single replicable, empirical study.140

“The endowment effect is the phenomenon whereby people value
something more when they own it than when they do not own it.”141
The effect increases with time.142 It cannot be gainsaid that
conservative Christians, throughout American history, have
“owned” a position of dominance in politics and culture.143
Interestingly, “the endowment effect will increase with the
evolutionary salience of the item in question. . . . ‘[E]volutionary

138

RUSSELL, supra note 124, at 7–8.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 71 (Alexander Hamilton).
140
John Wood, The “Constitution of Man”: Reflections on Human Nature from The
Federalist Papers to Behavioral Law and Economics, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 184,
207 (2013).
141
Justin L. Bernstein, Controlling Medicare with Lessons from Endowment
Effect Experiments, 49 CAL. W. L. REV. 169, 170 (2013).
142
Id. at 177.
143
See JONES, supra note 1, at 38–39.
139
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salience’ . . . is the connection an organism perceives between its
survival and [an] item. Thus, food has more evolutionary salience
than toys.”144
“Aversion to losses is one of the most robust phenomena in the
pantheon of decision theory . . . . It even has a neurological
basis.”145
Loss
aversion . . . ,
as
psychologists
dubbed
this
phenomenon, . . . [posits] that preferences . . . depend upon the
position people currently occupy (reference-dependent choice). It
also leads to a preference for the status quo . . . . Loss aversion
induces people to value commodities more once they own
them . . . , [and] when [facing] . . . losses, an aversion to sure
losses leads to risk-seeking conduct; people choose options that
hold out hope of losing as little as possible, even when those
options are economically less attractive than [other]
options . . . .146

If the psychological tendency to hold on to what one has is powerful
enough to warrant risk-seeking behaviors as an alternative, then
it would seem that the prospect of losing the status quo,
particularly for individuals or groups possessed of long-term power
and dominance, might induce anxieties that seem, psychologically,
palpable and intense.147
The dominance of Judeo-Christian norms prevailed for so
much of the nation’s modern history that it has become a reference
point against which to judge historical and cultural
developments.148 What might seem to a secularist or a merely
144

Bernstein, supra note 141, at 176.
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Gains, Losses, and Judges:
Framing and the Judiciary, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 521, 523 (2018).
146
Id. at 524–25.
147
For a good discussion of how these principles and “prospect theory” apply to
economic decision-making, see Aurora Harley, Prospect Theory and Loss Aversion:
How Users Make Decisions, NIELSEN NORMAN GROUP (June 19, 2016),
https://www.nngroup.com/articles/prospect-theory/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2019).
148
See Frederick Mark Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, Uncivil Religion:
Judeo-Christianity and the Ten Commandments, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 275, 281–82
(2007) (“Waves of European immigrants in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries exposed ‘nonsectarian’ Christianity as essentially Protestant. This period is
accordingly marked by periodic Catholic and Jewish resistance to assimilation by
‘nonsectarian’ Christian culture, especially in the public schools. By the 1950s,
however, these conflicts had largely abated. Succeeding generations of Catholic and
Jewish immigrants had absorbed some of the Protestant individualism implicit in
‘nonsectarianism,’ while nonsectarianism itself loosened its ties to Protestant beliefs
and observances. This permitted a reformulation of the American civil religion
from ‘nonsectarian’ Christianity to a more plausible transdenominational
‘Judeo-Christianity.’ Thus did Justice Douglas declare in the early 1950s that
145
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indifferent citizen to be nothing more than benign historical
evolution as the United States moves away from conservative
Christian moorings must seem to some conservative Christians an
acute trigger of loss aversion with respect to the societal and
cultural largesse with which they have for so long been endowed.
C. Persecution
The upshot of all this is a claim of persecution, and
persecution is something that a conservative Christian believer
should welcome even while decrying its injustice. It seems fair to
say that if conservative Christians do not feel persecuted, then
they must not be doing religion the right way—because the Bible
teaches that believers, if they are doing it right, can expect to be
persecuted.149 Among the Bible verses discussing the inevitability
of persecution to Christians who do Christ’s will are the following:
• “Indeed, all who desire to live a godly life in Christ Jesus
will be persecuted . . . .”150
• “Beloved, do not be surprised at the fiery trial when it comes
upon you to test you, as though something strange were
happening to you. But rejoice insofar as you share Christ’s
sufferings, that you may also rejoice and be glad when his
glory is revealed. If you are insulted for the name of Christ,
you are blessed, because the Spirit of glory and of God rests
upon you.”151
• “Blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness’
sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.”152
• “Blessed are you when others revile you and persecute
you and utter all kinds of evil against you falsely on
my account.”153
• “If the world hates you, know that it has hated me before it
hated you. If you were of the world, the world would love
you as its own; but because you are not of the world, but I
chose you out of the world, therefore the world hates you.
Americans are a ‘religious’ rather than a ‘Christian’ people, and that American
institutions presuppose belief in a ‘Supreme Being,’ which presumably signified the
Jewish as well as the Christian God.” (citations omitted)).
149
See generally Stephen Smith (ed.), 100 Bible Verses about Persecution,
OPENBIBLE.INFO, https://www.openbible.info/topics/persecution (last visited Oct.
12, 2019).
150
Id. (quoting 2 Timothy 3:12 (English Standard Version)).
151
Id. (quoting 1 Peter 4:12–14).
152
Id. (quoting Matthew 5:10).
153
Id. (quoting Matthew 5:11).
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Remember the word that I said to you: ‘A servant is not
greater than his master.’ If they persecuted me, they will
also persecute you. If they kept my word, they will also
keep yours.”154
The natural tendency, then, would be to see persecution,
which in a sense is a welcome marker of piety and faith, as present
wherever it is even arguably in play:
Any number of issues have given rise to the use by various
persons of the label “persecution” to describe the treatment of
Catholic or other Christians in this country:
• The Health and Human Services mandate that
employers (including Catholic universities and hospitals)
provide contraceptive coverage for their employees,
which the outgoing president of the Ethics and Religious
Liberty Commission characterized as “by definition, a
form of religious persecution.”
• The lack of satisfactory religious exemptions in state
statutes governing same-sex marriage as well as lawsuits
against companies who refuse to provide services to gay
couples.
• Laws that seek to force Catholic adoption and foster care
agencies to allow gays to adopt children (or punish those
who do not).
• Restrictions on evangelization in the military. . . .
• Not being able to put Christian symbols on public
buildings, such as the Ten Commandments on school
buildings.155

And as Professor Susan J. Stabile also notes:
Once people see themselves as “persecuted,” their instinctive
reaction is to fight and resist. And the fight becomes fierce
because a kind of circle the wagon mentality arises and anyone
outside that circle is the enemy. And when we are talking in
religious terms, the enemy is evil. If I believe I am persecuted, I
must fight to defend myself. It is not just that someone disagrees
with me[;] I am being attacked.156

In a similar vein, “Where a spirit of ferocious dogmatism
prevails, any opinion with which men disagree is liable to provoke
a breach of the peace. Schoolboys are apt to ill-treat a boy whose
opinions are in any way odd, and many grown men have not got
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Id. (quoting John 15:18–20).
Stabile, supra note 120, at 754–55 (citation omitted).
Id. at 765.
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beyond the mental age of schoolboys.”157 This is especially so with
regard to “beliefs . . . instilled into the minds of the young . . . . The
beliefs are instilled, not by giving any reason for supposing them
true, but by . . . repetition . . . and mass suggestion.”158 Once
dogmatic beliefs are instilled, and when it turns out that
competing creeds have been instilled in different populations,
these creeds “produce two armies which clash, not two parties that
can discuss. Each . . . feels that everything most sacred is bound
up with the victory of his side, [and that] everything most horrible
is exemplified by the other side.”159 So there is no soft landing for
the losing side in a battle between creeds, particularly where one
or both is grounded in the repetition of rote dogmas; there is,
rather, total loss—a psychic injury as grave as it is invisible
and ethereal.
Once again, we see indicia of acute injury—attack—even in
the insult of mere neutrality or in the refusal to allow conservative
Christians to intervene in the lives of others. And as mentioned
earlier, claims of persecution and injury can seem forlorn and
overwrought. One scholar has likened the rhetoric of religious
conservatives in the “Culture Wars” to conservative rhetoric on the
“War on Terror.”160 As she explains, “[t]he commonalities between
emergency rhetoric in the War on Terror and in the Culture Wars
are indisputable. In both cases, conservatives have framed
historical events (small or large) in terms of injury, enmity, crisis,
and emergency.”161 As Professor Stabile notes, these despairing
claims of persecution and injury emerge even when religious
conservatives are merely restrained from interceding in the lives
and belief systems of others, as when they are asked to refrain
from evangelizing in the military, or to abide by
anti-discrimination laws that protect LGBT Americans, or to
provide insurance coverage to employees that makes it employees’
choice rather than employers’ choice whether to access and use
contraceptives for sexual or health purposes.162
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To the last example, if I am a believer whose dogmas were
once central and whose deeply held beliefs require my intercession
in the lives of others, then I need not be compelled to directly
provide contraceptives to others to suffer a free exercise injury; it
is, rather, an affront to my religious freedom even that I must
allow the use of contraceptives by those in my employ.163 My
freedom to do what? To not allow it—not among my employees
and not in my sphere of conscious awareness. And if the
government permits me to opt out of the program only by filing a
form, the government has coerced me into actively releasing others
from obedience to my will.164 By opting out of participating in their
sin, I am forced to abide it—when my belief system requires me
not just to exist in peace as to my own life, but also to stop the sins
of others, or at least to try. This is the nature of evangelism and
proselytizing: I cannot achieve my own salvation without the
involvement of others, and to be free to practice my religion, I must
therefore be free to involve myself in the lives of others, or at least
not to participate in their emancipation from the strictures of my
beliefs.165 In this view of things, the government’s refusal to allow
me to manage the contraceptive choices of my employees will have
caused me great anxiety and angst—indeed to fear for the fate of
my soul in its eternal fate. And surely, that is the greatest injury
imaginable.
So under the conservative religious worldview, generally
applicable and neutral laws, when they require adherents to
traditional religious beliefs to accede to secular policy outcomes
that offend sectarian sensibilities, are, in a sense, discriminatory.
A natural corollary to this view is the notion that the government’s
active promotion of religion merely constitutes non-discrimination
or anti-discrimination:
[F]aith-based programs formally adopt the language of
anti-discrimination. The concept begins with the premise that
religious groups historically have been excluded from
government benefits, which amounts to anti-religious
discrimination. To avoid or eliminate this discrimination, there
163

See generally, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
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must be a government initiative to ensure that religious groups
are restored to a position of equality with their non-religious
peers. This is essentially a variation on the rhetoric of
affirmative action, applied to secure religious benefits from
government spending programs. While this reasoning might
have merit in circumstances where past discrimination unrelated
to legitimate principles separating church and state can be
demonstrated, it is complicated both by the commands of the
Establishment Cause [sic] and by the inherent potential for
claims of anti-discrimination to cloak motives of religious
preference.166

So it is not just that the government must allow evangelicals
to proselytize or to involve themselves in the contraceptive choices
of the employees in their charge. The government must also give
money for tire tar to churches, because any effort to disentangle
the government from religion—in other words, governmental
neutrality as to religion—is, in this view, in fact discriminatory.
Put simply, conservative Christians consider themselves
entitled to the centrality of their purposes and missions in
American life, and they see their emerging extra-centrality as an
acute injury that, even if merely psychic in nature, is also concrete
and palpable.
IV. PROPHYLACTIC FREE EXERCISE REQUIRES INSULT AS INJURY
Some lower courts have applied a standing test in free exercise
cases that reflects the dynamic—rather than the prophylactic view
of the Free Exercise Clause—that fails to account for the forces
that undergird the conservative Christian conception of injury.
Consider a recent case from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,
Nikolao v. Lyon.167 Under Michigan law, children must be
vaccinated before entering public school.168 In Nikolao, the
plaintiff, a mother, objected on religious grounds to having her
children vaccinated.169 Michigan allowed the plaintiff to get a
waiver, but she first had to meet with a local health official and
explain the reason for her objection.170 Two health department
nurses failed to convince the mother to have her children
vaccinated.171 After getting the waiver, she sued, claiming that the
166
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170
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exemption process—called the Certification Rule172—ran afoul of
the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.173 Before
turning to the merits of the parent’s constitutional claims, the
court addressed whether she had standing to sue.
As discussed briefly above, to have Article III standing to sue,
a plaintiff must show that: (1) she has suffered an injury-in-fact,
(2) the injury was caused by the defendant, and (3) the injury is
redressable by a court.174 Under Sixth Circuit precedent, standing
to assert a free exercise claim is grounded in coercion.175 This
approach is consistent with the idea of dynamic free exercise—the
idea that the exercise of religion involves the performance or
practice of religious rites or rituals or the overt expression of
religious belief. Thus, “a litigant suffers an injury to her free
exercise rights when the state compels her ‘to do or refrain from
doing an act forbidden or required by [her] religion, or to affirm or
disavow a belief forbidden or required by [her] religion.’ ”176
As part of the exemption process, the plaintiff in Nikolao was
exposed to information she disagreed with in the form of a
Religious Waiver Note.177 The Religious Waiver Note was a list of
responses to common religion-based objections to vaccines.178 But
according to the court, the plaintiff gave “no indication that the
information coerced her into doing or not doing anything.”179 None
of the information the government gave the plaintiff forced her to
change her religious beliefs.180 And she had “not presented any
facts to suggest that the state ha[d] coerced her in her religious
practices. As such, she ha[d] not suffered an injury-in-fact under
the Free Exercise Clause and [did] not have standing to pursue
that claim.”181 The court went so far as to say that:
Having to take time off from work to travel to and from the local
health office is not a sufficient injury for standing purposes
either. This requirement does [not] burden her practice of
172
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religion [or] discriminate against religion in any way, as all
parents seeking nonmedical exemptions must go through the
same process.182

In stating that the Sixth Circuit requires coercion for free
exercise standing, the court cited Mozert v. Hawkins County Board
of Education, in which the Sixth Circuit held that a student’s
parents had failed to present a cognizable free exercise violation
because there was no evidence that the defendant school district
“required [the student] to profess or deny a religious belief.”183
In some senses, the court’s reliance on the coercion test in a
religion-in-public-school case to assess standing in a free exercise
case seems misplaced. First, the coercion test is normally applied
in Establishment Clause cases to determine whether the
government has impermissibly promoted religion, not in Free
Exercise Clause cases to determine whether the government has
interfered with someone’s religious practices.184 Second, whereas
standing is a justiciability issue that normally precedes any
discussion of the merits of a case, the coercion test is normally
considered when a court is addressing the merits of a First
Amendment religion claim.185
But this is not to say that the Nikolao court’s reference to
coercion does not make sense. In fact, it makes eminent sense.
For one thing, the distinction between addressing a party’s
standing and addressing the merits of a case is largely an illusory
distinction; it is a distinction without a difference.186 Since an
analysis of a plaintiff’s standing requires a court to consider not
182
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facts such as whether the defendant qualifies as an employer or whether the
plaintiff is a person protected by the statute, the elements of standing—
injury in fact, causation, and redressability—go to who can sue whom for
what conduct and what remedy. If that question goes to the underlying
merits in the context of subject-matter jurisdiction, it also should go to the
merits in the context of standing.
Unfortunately, the Court has been less ready to acknowledge standing as
erroneously constitutionalized merits to the same extent it has with
adjudicative jurisdiction.
Id. (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
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only whether the plaintiff was injured, but also whether the injury
was caused by the defendant, a court must sometimes delve into
the merits of a claim—particularly where causation is an element
of the claim—to rule on the threshold matter of standing.187
Second, and more importantly, although the coercion issue
typically comes up in establishment cases, it might fit better in
free exercise cases—and some establishment cases might better be
framed as free exercise cases. For example, when a public school
forces a student—a non-adherent to majoritarian religious
beliefs—to participate in a pre-class prayer, one issue is obviously
whether the school has thereby established religion.188 In that
context, the Supreme Court has applied the coercion test to
determine whether a student has been made to feel like an
outsider.189 But the better question might be whether, by
compelling this kind of participation, the school has violated the
free exercise rights of the student. The issue of whether the
student has been made to violate his or her own beliefs in an active
and kinetic way seems more on point than the question of whether
the school was promoting religion in a way that constituted
establishment—although again, that question is clearly relevant.
And what better way exists to decide whether a person’s free
exercise rights have been violated than to ask whether the person
has been forced—coerced—to participate in or practice an overtly
religious undertaking or to abstain from an overtly religious
undertaking?190 It would be hard to imagine a more common-sense
approach to the issue of free exercise and to the question whether
a plaintiff has suffered a free exercise injury.
Nonetheless, the coercion standard as a component of
standing doctrine in free exercise cases is unlikely to survive the
new Supreme Court majority for long. If a plaintiff may allege a
free exercise injury merely by dint of her having to provide health
insurance coverage to an employee,191 having to sign and submit a
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form to opt out of providing such coverage,192 or having to exist
without state assistance in repaving a playground,193 then surely
a plaintiff who has had to submit herself to state counseling as to
religious matters, with all the time and angst involved in that
process,194 has suffered an injury as well. In fact, it would be a free
exercise injury to be required under the law to have a child
vaccinated at all, never mind having also to explain oneself to the
state and be lectured by medical professionals.195
The argument that the plaintiff in Nikolao was not required
to do anything religious would seem to be unavailing in light of the
prophylactic approach to free exercise now prevailing among
conservative federal judges. Providing health insurance is not
religious, and neither is complying with bureaucratic form-filling
requirements. Nor, of course, is paving a playground. In Nikolao,
since state health officials counseled the plaintiff about religious
beliefs as to vaccinations, there actually was a religious component
to the activity the plaintiff was forced to undertake. More to the
point, though, it would not have mattered were the entire
undertaking devoid of any religious references. The state’s failure
to abide and accommodate the plaintiff’s religious beliefs, no
matter how nonreligious the context, was a concrete and palpable
injury if federal courts are to abide the approach reflected in
Burwell, Masterpiece Cake Shop, Trinity Lutheran Church, and
Priests for Life. As journalist Katherine Stewart noted:
In his dissenting opinion in Priests for Life v. Health and Human
Services, Judge Kavanaugh argued that requiring an
organization to fill out a one-page form that would have exempted
it from providing contraception coverage imposed a “substantial
burden” on its free exercise of religion. He appears to feel keenly
the anguish of priests and nuns living in a nation where
women have a range of lawfully and medically supported health
care options.196

We end where we began: anguish and angst, in the coming age of
prophylactic free exercise, will be regarded as concrete and
palpable injuries.
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CONCLUSION
In the future, should the Court adopt the dynamic view of free
exercise, the coercion standard endorsed in Nikolao would be
appropriate. As it stands today, however, the dynamic view of free
exercise seems to command only a minority on the Court.
According to Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent in the denial of
rehearing the case Priests for Life en banc, the problem under the
ACA was that plaintiffs, by filling out and filing a form, were
required to participate in their employees’ choices to access
contraceptive care. Under this logic, when I must release others
from the strictures of my own beliefs, I am no longer free—free to
involve myself in the behavior of others and conform them to my
own preferences, or at least to try; free to exist without the
awareness that I am not in control; and free to participate in a
society where my own God, through me and my fealty to His will,
is sovereign. If I am a believer and you are not, then you are not
free from my involvement in your life; to abide my own right to
free exercise, you must participate in my project and my mission.

